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in the principal case to enjoin the Commission's order. 20  This means
that the Government is without remedy in its present action whereas the
railroads in a Commission ruling adverse to their interests would have
been able to have brought the case before the district court for review
of the Commission ruling- 7
"The Government is always at liberty . . . to avail itself of all the
remedies which the law allows to every person, natural or artificial, for
the vindication and assertion of its rights."' 2  And yet the decision in
the principal case provides a judicial cloak behind which private interests
may seek immunity from judicial review sought by the Government of
decisions favorable to those private interests.
ROBERT D. LARSEN.
Automobiles-Repurchase Option Contracts-Enforceability
Thereof
To combat the practice of quick resale to a "used car" lot, where
today's demand permits new motor vehicles to be sold far above their
original price, many dealers have employed a repurchase option contract.
These provide that, if during the life of the agreement (usually six
months) the purchaser \vishes to sell the car, he will give the first re-
fusal to the dealer for a fixed or determinable price. In addition, some
contracts stipulate that for failure to perform, a certain sum shall be
paid as liquidated damages.,
In any suit to enforce' such a contract the defense that the law does
not favor restrictions deterring the sale of chattels must be met. But
in light of the present situation in the automobile market, there should
be -a strong public policy in favor of these contracts as a device for
cutting the price of "used cars" by accelerating delivery to legitimate
purchasers.
Another problem present in all these contracts is that of considera-
tion. The contract states that it is a part of the consideration for the
sale of the car, and this interpretation has been upheld.1 A close analogy
to the contracts in questions may be found in similar transactions relating
to corporate stock. In such a situation the Massachusetts court 2 said that
the consideration was the purchase price plus the agreement to offer the
"' Lambert Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 258 U. S. 377 (1922) ; North Dakota
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 257 U. S. 485, 490 (1922) ("Complete justice requires
that the railroads not be subjected to the risk of two irreconcilable commands-
that of the I. C. C. enforced by a decree on the one side and that of this court
on the other.").
27 Cf. United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226 (1938).2  United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 222 (1882).
'Schuler v. Dearing Chevrolet Co., 76 Ga. App. 570, 46 S. E. 2d 611 (1948).
- New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432 (1894).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
stock to the company if a sale were contemplated. In this respect a
seller's agreement to repurchase is the same as his option to repurchase
insofar as the duty upon the buyer is concerned, for in either case he
is bound to offer before selling elsewhere; therefore the rulings of such
cases are authority here. These cases uniformly say that such agree-
ments are valid terms of the sale, supported by its consideration, and
that the claim of lack of mutuality of obligation is not a defense.3
For the equitable enforcement of these contracts there are three
theories: specific performance, rescission for fraud, and equitable servi-
tude. To succeed on the first theory the dealer must overcome the
barrier that specific performance is not usually granted in personal prop-
erty contracts unless the remedy at law is inadequate. 4  To show in-
adequacy he can plead injury to his good will and reputation in that.
if his cars are seen on "used car"' lots, people will say that he is not
careful to whom he sells, which in turn may lead to repercussions from
national headquarters. A resale may result in damage actually impos-
sible to ascertain, for dealers usually have repair and servicing shops
from which a large part of their income is derived, and they have reason
to expect that most cars kept in the hands of the purchaser will be
returned to them for some later work. Furthermore, under a policy.
directed toward eliminating such resales, damages would not be as,
efficient a remedy.
A second theory that the. dealer might pursue is rescission of
the sale for fraudulent intent not to abide by this repurchase contract
when the sale was made. Unless there were witnesses to testify as to
the purchaser's intention, the proof of it would have to be circumstan-
tial, in which case it would be strongest ivhen the resale was made
within a few days.
A third equitable theory would be that of a servitude. But since it
is seldom recognized for personal property5 and its use here would add
nothing that could not be accomplished by specific performance, it is
not recommended. Furthermore, the purpose of this doctrine seems to
be to force holders of the chattel who were not in privity with the orig-
inal contract to comply with the servitude, while in the situation in
question the objective of the dealer is to keep the chattel from being
transferred from the first purchaser; therefore it appears that this is not
the type of problem for which the equitable servitude theory was
intended.
'46 Am. JUR., Sales §509; see Note, 60 A. L. R. 215, 232 (1929).
, As to the adequacy of damages in suits on dealer's contracts to sell new cars
see Note, 62 HAnv. L. Rlv. 149 (1949), and Simpson, Equity in 1947 ANN. SUR.
Am. LAw 811 (1948).
'Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1928):;
Baer, Performer's Right to Enjoin Unlicensed Broadcasts of Recorded Renditions,
19 N. C. L. Ray. 202, 205 (1941).
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Present in the enforcement by any one of these theories is the
problem of giving notice of the contract to any third party who might
buy the car. Since in the majority of cases the car will already have
been resold when the dealer learns of it, notice is necessary to prevent
a bona fide purchaser from cutting off the equitable remedies. This
could usually be accomplished by writing on the title that such a con-
tract had been made relating to this automobile. Even though there
may be no place reserved on the title for this entry, there seems to be
no legal objection to putting such a notation on the certificate. If in
seeking one of these remedies adequate notice has not been provided for
third party purchasers, the dealer, under the theory that the purchaser
was threatening to sell, would have to take steps to restrain a resale
before it was made.6 To avoid the question of notice the dealer could
retain the title for six months, but for reasons of salesmanship and
future good will it does not appear feasible.
In regard to the effectiveness in North Carolina of notice of this
contract being placed on the certificate of title, the rules laid down in
Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co.,7 that the sale of an auto-
mobile without the transfer of title is valid and that the protection for
mortgagees is in recordation, are broad enough to cover the issue here.8
Although the certificate ordinarily would pass on sale, it does not have
to, hence notice on it would not be a complete safeguard; but it seems
that if the contract were put on record as a lien the requisite notice
would have been given.
In lieu of or after failure of other remedies directed toward the
return of the chattel itself, the dealer can seek the legal remedy of dam-
ages for the breach of the contract between the parties. In proving his
damages the dealer's ethical problem may appear delicate for he must
show the price that he could have realized had he resold it as a "used
car" or had he, instead of the defendant, sold the car to a "used car"
dealer. Legally, however, there is no restriction on the price at which
a "used car" may be sold. Furthermore, if such profits were to be
made, the contract stipulated who was to receive them and should be
binding on the parties. If his contract is one of those which contains a
provision for liquidated damages, the dealer need only plead the contract
as it stands, leaving the burden of proof on the defendant to show that
8 The defendant could be subjected to contempt proceedings if he did not obey
the restraining order.
7190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925).
' The court held that the statutes governing transfer and registration of titles
for automobiles [N. C. GEN. STAT. §§20-50, 72, 74 (1943)] did not replace the
recordation law for mortgages, liens, and encumbrances. They distinguished the
North Carolina statutes from those of other states which read that the sale with-
out transfer of title is invalid or void.
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the damages are such as to be a penalty.9 Even though under such a
contract the dealer is not required to prove his actual damage,10 it
would be safer to do so and to show that it was difficult to estimate the
amount accurately when the contract was drawn.
In the two cases now reported involving the enforcement of these
contracts, it has not been necessary for the courts to pass directly on the
main issues. In Larson Buick Co. v. Mosca"- the facts disclosed obvious
fraud and the resale had been enjoined before an innocent purchaser in-
tervened. In Schuler v. Dearing Chevrolet Co. 2 the purchaser's demur-
rer was sustained because the company's pleadings did not show that it
had been damaged. However, from an over-all survey it appears that
the first problem is whether such contracts will be recognized at all by
the courts, to which it is submitted that in light of the present situation
in the automobile business they are highly desirable. The second prob-
lem, notice to the third party who buys from the original purchaser,
can be met by a notation on the title where it must be transferred as
part of a sale or by recordation of the contract in states like North
Carolina which do not make this requirement.
The solution most advantageous to the dealer would be a repurchase
contract which had its liquidated damages secured by a non-negotiable
note and a recorded chattel mortgage. Since this note and mortgage
would take effect only in event of a breach, they cannot be attacked as
a promise to pay more than the regular purchase price for the car.
Such a contract would deter reselling for it is not likely that a "used
car" dealer would want a vehicle with a mortgage against it which
must be paid to perfect the title. It would also give the notice neces-
sary for the use of an equitable remedy and protect against a breach by
an insolvent person. The majority of states recognize comity for
recordation, therefore a chattel mortgage properly recorded would be
constructive notice to a purchaser outside the state.13
MARSHALL T. SPEARS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Declaratory Judgment-Remedy
in Federal Constitutional Cases
The basic accomplishment of proceeding by declaratory judgment
is "that it enables the point in dispute to be raised at the inception of
the controversy, before damage has been done by acting upon one's own
'McCoRmicK, DAMAGES §157 (1935); Pace v. Z'ellmer, 194 Iowa 516, 186
N. W. 420 (1922).
1" If the court took judicial notice of the prevailing situation with regard to
"used cars," the opposition's claim of penalty would be met; if not, the better pro-
cedure would be to show the situation to rebut the claim.
1179 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
1276 Ga. App. 570, 46 S. E. 2d 611 (1948).
a' 10 Ams. JUR., Chattel Mortgages §21; see Note, 57 A. L. R. 702, 711 (1928).
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